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Abstract
A growing literature shows that life expectancy depends on the wage level. Using
an overlapping generations model with a small open economy, we explain why this re-
sult can change the redistributive properties of pension systems. Net contributions are
now progressive for beveridgian pension systems and regressive for bismarkian ones.
For mixed pension systems it is possible that collected resources are redistributed in
favour of the ends of the distribution of wages.
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1 Introduction
A wide literature studies the macroeconomic impact of the ageing of the population, no-
tably on the sustainability of pension systems1. This ageing process implies that reforms
have to be adopted by developed countries in order to limit the ﬁscal burden of pension
systems. Another dimension of the length of life has been explored recently. Indeed,
agents diﬀer by their life expectancy. More particulary, these diﬀerences between socio-
professional groups are wide. Mesrine (1999) studies the inequalities of length of life ac-
cording to socio-professional groups in France2. The most striking feature of his paper is
that a worker has a probability to die between 35 and 65 years old almost twice higher
than that of an executive manager. Furthermore, their life expectancy at 35 is 38 and 44
respectively. The same qualitative results are observed in the United-States (Panis and
Lillard (1995), Deaton and Paxson (2000)). Finally, Robert-Bobbée and Cadot (2007)
show that this inequality is also observed for elderly people. For agents who are 86, the
ones with highest education level can expect to live 20% longer than the ones with lowest
education level.
As socio-professional groups are linked to earnings, we can conclude from the previous
results that earnings have an impact on the length of life. Some empirical studies deal
with this link3. These life expectancy inequalities can have strong implications for the
redistributive properties of pension systems. Indeed, as rich agents live and beneﬁt from a
pension for a longer time, pension systems are not as redistributive as they seem. Conse-
quently, to study these properties, two dimensions have to be analyzed: (1) the distinction
between Beveridgian and Bismarkian systems, and (2) the relationship between wages and
life expectancy. Some authors studied the empirical implications of this distinction. Coro-
nado et al. (2000) and Liebman (2001) show that the pension system of the United-States
is far less progressive than is usually mentioned. Bommier et al. (2003) ﬁnd the same
qualitative results on french data.
However, theoretical implications of these new results have not been clearly studied.
Mitchell and Zeldes (1996) explain that:
1See d'Autume (2003), Charpin (1999), Cremer and Pestieau (2000) or Galasso and Profeta (2004)
among others. Here and in the rest of this paper we only consider Pay-As-You-Go pension systems.
2These inequalities also depend on other factors like sex or the geographical localization. For example,
in France the life expectancy of women is 84.1, whereas that of men is only 77.2 (INSEE, 2006). Moreover,
Rican and Salem (1999) show that there are strong disparities according to the localization of people in
France.
3See Attanasio and Emmerson (2001), Bommier et al. (2003) or Adams et al. (2003) for a survey.
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"Despite its intent, the system [the pension system] is less progressive than it
might seem, because there is a positive correlation between lifetime earnings and
length of life."
They emphasize the main role played by the inequalities of length of life but this sentence
raises a question: can a pension system be regressive?
Borck (2007) has exploited this idea. He shows that the size of a pension system
can be determined by a coalition of elderly, very poor and very rich agents. Poor agents
beneﬁt from the Beveridgian part of the pension system, whereas rich agents beneﬁt the
longest time from the pension system. This paper of Borck can be seen as a study on the
consequences of the redistributive properties of pension systems when inequalities of length
of life are taken into account. Nevertheless, it is not an analysis of the redistributivity itself.
Consequently, our paper is the next step in order to analytically clarify this last point.
A pension system is purely Beveridgian if every agent receives the same pension. Con-
versely, a pension system is purely Bismarkian if pensions completely depend on the wages
of agents. A pension system is mixed if it has a Beveridgian and a Bismarkian compo-
nent. The more a pension system is Beveridgian, the higher intra-generational transfers
are. Countries highly diﬀer by this intra-generational component. France, Germany and
Italy have a Bismarkian structure. Canada, the Netherlands and New-Zeland are essen-
tially Beveridgian. Finally, Japan, the United-Kingdom and the United States have mixed
pension systems (Sommacal (2006), Casamatta et al. (2000)).
In this paper, we use an overlapping generations model in which agents diﬀer by their
wage and by their length of life. The pension system can be Beveridgian, Bismarkian or
a mix of the two as in Casamatta et al. (2000). To study the redistributivity of pension
systems we use the concept of "net contributions". The net contribution of an agent with
a given wage, is the actualized diﬀerence (at the growth rate of the population) between
the tax paid and the beneﬁt from the pension system (Drouhin, 2001). A positive net
contribution implies that agents pay more than they receive from the pension system.
In order to well understand the qualitative changes induced by inequalities of length of
life we ﬁrst consider that every agent has the same length of life. In this speciﬁc case, it
is possible to show that if pension systems are at least partially Beveridgian then it is also
progressive. But if the pension system is Bismarkian then the net contribution for each
agent is nil. Afterwards, we introduce inequalities of length of life and we consider the case
of a Beveridgian, a Bismarkian and of a mixed pension system successively. If the pension
system is Beveridgian then it is progressive, but the poorest do not necessarily beneﬁt the
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most from the pension system. Furthermore, the share of the population who beneﬁts from
a negative net contribution changes. If the pension system is Bismarkian, then we show
that it is regressive because the poorest have the most positive net contribution and the
richest the most negative one. If we have a mixed pension system our analytical results in
terms of net contributions can be generalized only if pension systems tend towards either
a Beveridgian or a Bismarkian structure. For intermediate cases, a numerical resolution
calibrated on French data is used. It does not describe the exact structure of the French
pension system but it emphasizes its important qualitative properties. We use diﬀerent
calibrations for the function which links the length of life with the wage level. We show
that it is possible that the ends of the distribution of wages beneﬁt from a negative net
contribution.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our model. In section 3, the
study of the redistributive properties of pension systems without inequalities of length of
life is detailed. In the following sections we assume that the length of life is linked to the
wage level. In section 4 and 5, we study a Beveridgian and a Bismarkian pension system
respectively. In section 6, we emphasize the main properties of mixed pension systems.
In section 7 we calibrate our model on french data. Section 8 provides some concluding
remarks.
2 The Model
We consider a small open economy in which agents live two periods4. At each period t,
the number of young agents is Nt. Population is assumed to grow at a constant rate n,
such that Nt = (1 + n)Nt−1. These agents are heterogenous since each of them has a
wage w which belongs to the interval Ωw = [w−, w+], with w− > 0. Wages are distributed
randomly among the population. f(w) denotes the density function of the random variable
w. Consequently, it is also the fraction of the population having a wage level w5. The
average wage of this economy can be written:
w¯ =
∫
Ωw
wf(w)dw (1)
Furthermore, we assume that agents live only a fraction T of their second period of life6.
This length of life is supposed to be linked to the wage level of agents: T = T (w), and
4The length of each period is normalized to 1.
5We assume that the size of each generation is suﬃciently large for the law of large numbers applies.
6There is no uncertainty in our model. Consequently agents are sure to live until the end of the fraction
T of their second period of life. However, our model can also be interpreted as a model in which (1 − T )
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more speciﬁcally we assume that T ′(w) > 0. It represents the inequalities of length of life
in function of socio-professional groups. The average length of life is:
T¯ =
∫
Ωw
T (w)f(w)dw (2)
The linkage between the wage level and the length of life is measured by the covariance:
COVT,w =
∫
Ωw
T (w)wf(w)dw − T¯ w¯ (3)
As we assume that T ′(w) > 0, then we have COVT,w > 07.
Moreover, we make the following assumption about the function T (w):
Assumption 1: T ′(w) > 0, T ′′(w) < 0, ET/w = T ′(w) wT (w) < 1, and −T ′′(w) wT ′(w) < 2.
The ﬁrst part of this assumption is standard and represents the decreasing marginal
impact of wages on the length of life. The assumption on the elasticity implies that an
increase in wages of x% implies an increase in the length of life of less than x%. The last
part of this assumption is only a technical hypothesis which will be used later in the paper8.
Each agent works when he is young and retires at the end of his ﬁrst period of life9. It
is the same assumption than this used in Casamatta et al. (2000) or in Borck (2007). As
long as an agent works, he pays a payroll tax τ . This tax is used to ﬁnance a PAYG pension
system. When old, an agent receives a pension p(w). Pensions are paid as long as agents
are still alive, i.e. during a fraction T (w) of their second period of life (d'Autume, 2003).
Furthermore, pensions per unit of time are partly indexed on the wage of the ﬁrst period of
the agent and on the average wage of the economy (αw+(1−α)w¯). α measures the size of
would be the probability to die at the end of the ﬁrst period of life as in Drouhin (2001).
7See Appendix A.
8Some main functions respect this property. For example: T (w) = aw+b, or T (w) = γwξ with a,b,γ > 0
and 1 > ξ > 0.
9In this paper we do not consider the length of education and the retirement age whereas it has an impact
on the redistributive properties of pension systems. Indeed, the length of education and the retirement age
are positively correlated with the wage level. Then, a strong link between education and wages decreases
the progressivity of pension systems, whereas the positive correlation between the retirement age and
the wage level increases the progressivity of pension systems. However, in this paper we only analyse
the redistributive properties of unfunded pension systems when life expectancy inequalities are taken into
account. In this way we emphasize the main role played by the mortality diﬀerential neutralizing other
channels.
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the Bismarkian part of the pension system, whereas (1−α) measures the Beveridgian part
of the pension system. When α = 1 then the pension system is completely Bismarkian
because pensions are only indexed on activity wages of each agent. Conversely, when α = 0
every agent receives the same pension. In that case, the pension system is Beveridgian.
Finally, agents receive only a fraction (λ) of this weighted average (αw+(1−α)w¯) per
unit of time. λ denotes the average replacement rate of the pension system. Consequently,
the pension p(w) which an agent receives during his second period of life is:
p(w) = λ(αw + (1− α)w¯)T (w) (4)
We assume that there is no debt in this economy. It implies that all pensions have to be
ﬁnanced by a tax on wages. The budget constraint of the government can be written:
Nt
∫
Ωw
τwf(w)dw = Nt−1
∫
Ωw
λ(αw + (1− α)w¯)T (w)f(w)dw
Some straightforward calculations imply that:
τ = λ
αCOVT,w + w¯T¯
(1 + n)w¯
(5)
Let us ﬁrst study the case where every agent has the same length of life, that is:
T (w) = T¯ , ∀w. In that case we have COVT,w = 0, and the tax rate becomes (as in
d'Autume (2003)):
τ = λ
T¯
(1 + n)
The higher the replacement rate is, the higher the tax rate necessary to ﬁnance the
pension system is. Indeed, an increase in the generosity has to be ﬁnanced with a higher
tax on young agents. Furthermore, the higher the old age dependency ratio
(
T¯
(1+n)
)
is,
the higher the tax rate has to be. If for each worker there are more old agents, and for a
given generosity of the pension system, then the tax rate has to increase to ﬁnance these
additional pensions.
Let us now consider the case where COVT,w > 0, i.e. that there are inequalities of length
of life. Everything else equal, the introduction of inequalities of length of life increases the
tax rate of the pension system. Indeed, the richer agents are, the longer they live and
then the longer the period during which they receive a pension is. Conversely, the poorer
agents are, the shorter the period during which they receive a pension is. If pensions are
even partially indexed on the activity wage of agents (by a coeﬃcient α) then the highest
pensions are paid to people who live for the longest period. The tax rate has to increase to
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ﬁnance this additional spending. Now, if the pension system has a Beveridgian structure
(α = 0), then even if the covariance is large, the decrease in spending for agents with a
length of life smaller than T¯ exactly compensates the increase in spending for the others10.
At each period t, a group of agents with a wage w pays: τwf(w)Nt, whereas at the
same time agents with the same productivity receive p(w)f(w)Nt−1. Our main objective is
to know if at each period a group of agents with a wage w receives more from the pension
system than he pays for it, i.e. if p(w)f(w)Nt−1 is larger than τwf(w)Nt. But the model
also permits to determine the wage of the group who beneﬁts the most from the pension
system, i.e. who receives the most given the amount he pays.
At each period t, the net contribution of a group with a wage w is:
CNw,t = τwf(w)Nt − p(w)f(w)Nt−1
or,
CNw,t = Ntf(w)
[
τw − p(w)
1 + n
]
The member between brackets represents the net contribution of an agent with a wage
w if he uses the growth rate of the population as actualisation rate (Drouhin, 2001). A
positive net contribution means that a group pays more for the pension system than he
receives from it. Using equations (4) and (5) we obtain:
CNw,t = λf(w)Nt−1
[
αCOVT,w + w¯T¯
w¯
w − (αw + (1− α)w¯)T (w)
]
(6)
Integrating this function over the interval Ωw, it is straightforward to show that
∫
Ωw
CNw,tdw =
0.
But this amount is biased by the size of each group. Indeed, a high net contribution
can reﬂect a large size of a group. So it is better to use the individual net contribution for
each group. It can be written:
CN iw,t = λ
[
αCOVT,w + w¯T¯
w¯
w − (αw + (1− α)w¯)T (w)
]
≡ λA(w) (7)
Note that the size of the pension system (λ) has only a quantitative eﬀect because it
does not inﬂuence the sign of A(w). λ ampliﬁes the net contribution of each agent.
10Because of the linearity of pensions in (4).
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The form and the sign of the function A(w) are not trivial because of the function
T (w). To well understand the main implications of such a function we ﬁrst study the case
where there are no inequalities of length of life. Then, we introduce inequalities of length
of life and we study the case where α = 0 and the case where α = 1 successively. Finally,
we give the main properties of a mixed pension system, i.e. a system with a Beveridgian
and a Bismarkian part.
3 The Benchmark Case
This section details the results for the case where every agent in our economy has the same
length of life: T (w) = T¯ , ∀w. It is an usual assumption. Agents only diﬀer by their wages.
This uni-dimensionality of the heterogeneity often simpliﬁes the analysis but masks a very
diﬀerent reality. Let us ﬁrst study the conclusions that would be obtained if we had only
considered wage inequalities.
If T (w) = T¯ , ∀w, then COVT,w = 0 and ﬁnally:
A1(w) = (1− α)T¯ (w − w¯) (8)
A(w) is a strictly increasing function of w as long as α ∈ [0, 1) (see ﬁgure (1)). Further-
more, the net contribution is negative for agents having wages below the average. It implies
that poor agents receive more from the pension system than they pay for it. Conversely,
the net contribution is positive for agents having wages above the average wage.
Proposition 1: (i) Every agent with a wage below (above) the average wage has a neg-
ative (positive) net contribution. (ii) The poorest beneﬁt the most from the redistributive
properties of the pension system. This net beneﬁt is a decreasing function of w.
Proof : (i) A(w) is negative for w < w¯ and positive for w > w¯. (ii) A(w) is a strictly
increasing function of w.2
The second part of this proposition implies that the poorest have the highest negative
net contribution. This result depends on the assumption that the pension system is at least
partly Beveridgian (α ∈ [0, 1)). If α = 1 then the pension system is completely Bismarkian
because the pension is only indexed on the activity wage of agents.
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Figure 1: Net Contributions for T (w) = T¯ ∀w
Proposition 2: If α = 1 then the net contribution of each group is nil. The pension
system is not redistributive.
Proof : See equation (8).2
This result ensures that a Bismarkian pension system in an economy where agents only
diﬀer by their wages, is neutral in terms of net contribution. Pensions exactly compensate
contributions to the pension system.
These two results are frequently encountered in the literature. The following sections
show that these results depend on the assumption that every agent has the same length of
life. If it is not the case, then the higher the wage is, the longer agents live, and the more
they beneﬁt from the pension system. Consequently, the intuition is that the redistributive
properties mentioned above change. Firstly because the poorest do not necessarily beneﬁt
the most from a Beveridgian pension system. Secondly because the Bismarkian pension
systems is not neutral.
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Figure 2: Net Contributions for α = 0.
4 Pure Beveridgian Pension Systems
For pure Beveridgian pension systems we have α = 0, i.e. that every agent receives the
same pension. This pension is indexed on the average wage of the economy. From this
section we assume that agents also diﬀer by their length of life: T (w), with T ′(w) > 0.
The expression for A(w) becomes:
A2(w) = wT¯ − w¯T (w) (9)
The properties of this function are such that: A′2(w) = T¯ − w¯T ′(w) and A′′2(w) =
−w¯T ′′(w). The sign of A′2(w) is indeterminate, but A′′2(w) is clearly positive under the
assumption 1 (see ﬁgure (2)).
Proposition 3: There exists a threshold wˆ such that the net contribution is negative
(positive) for w < wˆ (w > wˆ). Furthermore wˆ > w¯ if and only if T¯ < T (w¯).
Proof : Under assumption 1, we know that T (w)/w is a decreasing function of w. Fur-
thermore, A2(w) > 0 if and only if T (w)/w < T¯/w¯. A2(w) can not be positive for every w
as the sum of net contributions is equal to 0. Finally, as T (w)/w is a decreasing function
10
of w, we conclude that there exists a threshold value wˆ such that A2(w) < 0 for w < wˆ,
and A2(w) > 0 for w > wˆ. wˆ > w¯ if and only if A2(w¯) < 0.2
This result ensures that poor agents (with a wage below wˆ) have a negative net contri-
bution. Moreover, if the average length of life is smaller than the length of life of the average
wage then a larger group beneﬁts from the redistributive eﬀect of the pension system. The
more T¯ is diﬀerent from T (w¯), the more wˆ removes away from w¯. This result is intuitive.
Indeed, a high average length of life implies that the taxe rate of the pension system is
higher. Then the share of the population who beneﬁts from a negative net contribution
decreases (wˆ < w¯).
But we also have to compare the net contribution A2(w) with A1(w). It is easy to show
that A2(w) > A1(w) (<) as long as T (w) < T¯ (>). It implies that poor workers beneﬁt
less from the pension system and that rich workers pay less for the pension system.
Because of the convexity of the function A2(w), if there exists a value wM such that
A′2(wM ) = 0, then it is a minimum. It has two implications for our analysis. (i) The richest
contribute the most to the pension system because of the convexity of A2(w). They have
the highest positive net contribution. (ii) The poorest do not necessarily beneﬁt the most
from the redistributivity of the pension system.
Lemma 1: wˆ > wM > w− if and only if A′2(w−) < 0. wM = w− if and only if
A′2(w−) ≥ 0.
Considering A′2(w−), this expression is negative if T ′(w−) is suﬃciently large. It means
that the marginal impact of wages on the length of life is large for low values of wages.
Agents with a wage slightly higher than w− can expect to live a lot of more time than
agents with a wage w−. They receive a pension during this additional time. Consequently,
it is the agents from the group wM who beneﬁt the most from the pension system and wM
can be diﬀerent from w−.
The two main implications are: (i) The share of the population who beneﬁts from the
pension system can diﬀer from the interval [w−, w¯]. (ii) The agents who beneﬁt the most
from the pension system are not necessarily the poorest. It depends on the properties of
the function T (w).
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Figure 3: Net Contributions for α = 1.
5 Pure Bismarkian Pension Systems
For pure Bismarkian pension systems, pensions are only indexed on activity wages (α = 1).
In section 3, we obtained that the net contributions are nil for every group if there are
no inequalities of length of life. But the introduction of these inequalities considerably
changes the qualitative results.
For α = 1, A(w) can be written:
A3(w) = w
COVT,w + w¯T¯
w¯
− wT (w) (10)
The sign of A′3(w) =
COVT,w+w¯T¯
w¯ − T (w) − wT ′(w) is indeterminate, but A′′3(w) =
−2T ′(w)−T ′′(w)w is clearly negative under assumption 1. Then A3(w) is a concave func-
tion of w (see ﬁgure (3)).
Proposition 4: There exists a threshold w˘ such that the net contribution is positive
(negative) for w < w˘ (w > w˘). w˘ is determined by the following equation:
T (w˘) = COVT,ww¯ + T¯
Proof : A3(w) > 0 if and only if T (w) <
COVT,w+w¯T¯
w¯ . As T (w) is a strictly increasing
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function of w and as the sum of the net contributions is equal to 0, then as long as w < w˘
we have T (w) < T (w˘) and the net contribution is positive. But for w > w˘ the net contri-
bution is negative.2
This result is completely diﬀerent from this of proposition 2. Rich agents beneﬁt from
a negative net contribution whereas poor agents have a positive net contribution. But the
result of this section is even more surprising. Indeed, as A3(w) is a concave function of
w then if there exists a value wmax such that A′3(w) = 0, it is a maximum. The highest
positive value of A3(w) is obtained for w = w+. Given the result of proposition 4 we can
write that wmax ∈ [w−, w˘), and more precisely:
Lemma 2: wmax = w− as long as A′3(w−) =
COVT,w+w¯T¯
w¯ − T (w−) − w−T ′(w−) ≤ 0.
wmax ∈ (w−, w˘) if and only if A′3(w−) > 0.
A′3(w−) is positive if T ′(w−) is not too large, i.e. if agents with a wage slightly higher
than w− can expect to have a life expectancy only just higher than this of agents with a
wage w−.
Two main conclusions can be obtained from this analysis. (i) Pure Bismarkian pension
systems are regressive because poor agents have a positive net contribution and rich agents
have a negative one. (ii) If T ′(w−) is suﬃciently large, then the poorest have the highest
positive net contribution. The concavity of A3(w) also implies that the richest have the
highest negative net contribution, what reinforces our previous conclusion.
6 Mixed Pension Systems
Let us assume from now that α ∈ (0, 1). If α tends towards 1 then the pension system
becomes more Bismarkian. Conversely, if α tends toward 0 the pension system becomes
more Beveridgian as the pension depends less on the wage of agents. The function A(w)
can be written as:
A4(w,α) = w
αCOVT,w + w¯T¯
w¯
− (αw + (1− α)w¯)T (w) (11)
But this function has indeterminate properties. Indeed ∂A4(w,α)/∂w can be positive,
negative or null. And ∂2A4(w,α)/∂w2 can also be positive, negative or null.
13
In order to obtain clear analytical results we specify the function T (w). We assume it
has the following form:
T (w) = γwξ (12)
with γ > 0 and 1 > ξ > 0. This function respects every property of assumption 1. Let us
ﬁrst study the concavity and the convexity of the function A4(w). Note that:
∂A4(w,α)
∂w
=
αCOVT,w + w¯T¯
w¯
− T ′(w)(αw + (1− α)w¯)− αT (w) (13)
and that:
∂2A4(w,α)
∂w2
= −T ′′(w)(αw + (1− α)w¯)− 2αT ′(w) (14)
Lemma 3: There exists a threshold value wp(α) such that if w < wp(α) (> wp(α))
then ∂
2A4(w,α)
∂w2
> 0 (< 0). It is such that ∂wp(α)∂α < 0. Furthermore, there exists an interval
(0, α+) such that for α ∈ (0, α+) we have wp(α) > w+; and a second interval (α−, 1) such
that for α ∈ (α−, 1) we have wp(α) < w−, with α+ < α−.
Proof : Using equation (12) we obtain that T ′′(w)/T ′(w) = (ξ−1)/w. Then using equa-
tion (14) it is straightforward to show that ∂
2A4(w,α)
∂w2
> 0 if and only if w < w¯ (1−ξ)(1−α)α(1+ξ) ≡
wp(α), with w′p(α) < 0. wp(0) = +∞ and wp(1) = 0.2
This result gives the properties in terms of convexity and of concavity of the function
A4(w). It implies that for a value of α suﬃciently small (inferior to α+) A4(w) is convex.
Conversely, for α suﬃciently high (superior to α−) A4(w) is concave.
Proposition 5: If A(w−, α−) > 0 and if A(w−, α+) < 0 then for α ∈ (0, α+) net
contributions behave qualitatively as in the pure Beveridgian case. And for α ∈ (α−, 1) net
contributions behave qualitatively as in the pure Bismarkian case.
Proof : The ﬁrst two conditions ensure that the poorest have a positive (negative) net
contribution in the interval (α−, 1) ((0, α+)).2
This result extends the qualitative properties of Bismarkian and Beveridgian pension
systems to intervals for the parameter α and not only to extreme values 0 and 1. Every
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pension system with an α in the interval (α−, 1) is regressive. Conversely, every pension
system with an α inferior to α+ is redistributive, whereas the poorest do not necessarily
beneﬁt the most from this pension system.
For α ∈ (α+, α−), we have to calibrate our model to know the exact form of net
contributions.
7 Calibration on French Data
In order to calibrate our model we ﬁrst have to specify wage inequalities. We assume
that wages belong to the interval: Ωw = [0.2, 9]. This interval is suﬃciently large for the
wage w+ is 45 times higher than w−. Piketty (2002), studying the distribution of wages
in France, ﬁnds a ratio of 5 between the wages of the ﬁrst and of the last decile. The gap
between this empirical fact and our calibration can be explained by the fact that we use
the two extreme values of a continuum and as a consequence wage inequalities are greater.
We choose this interval for Ωw because once it is combined with the density function of w,
our model matches the Gini coeﬃcient of the wage distribution calculated by Hairault and
Langot (2008) on French data.
The density function of the distribution of wages among the population has to respect
the essential property: mode<median<mean (Lambert, 2001, p.23). This property is
a common feature of most industrialized countries. It implies that the wage distribution
among the population is asymetric. The most common income level is less than the median
wage. And because of strong wage inequalities the median wage is less than the average
wage of the economy. Furthermore, the Gini index of wages has to tend towards 0.32
(Hairault and Langot, 2008). Lambert (2001) shows that the Gini index can be calculated
as:
G = −1 + 2
∫ w+
w−
wF (w)f(w)
w¯
dw
A useful density function is the density function of Weibull. It is asymmetric and it
has the following form:
f(w) =
c
b
(
w − a
b
)c−1
e−(
w−a
b )
c
(15)
if w > a, and f(w) = 0 for w ≤ a, with b and c > 0. The only problem with the use of
this function is that the
∫
Ωw
f(w)dw is not exactly 1. But the following calibration is such
that this integral is approximately 1: a = 0.2, b = 2 and c = 1.55. Furthermore, it implies
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Figure 4: Net Contributions for diﬀerent values of α and for β = 0.09
that F (w¯) > 0.5, with F () the cumulative distribution function, w¯ = 2, wmedian = 1.78
and G = 0.3245.
We now have to specify the relationship between wages and the length of life. We
assume that it has the following form:
T (w) = µwβ (16)
with β the elasticity of the length of life with respect to wages. µ is a scale parameter.
We assume that µ = 0.2. In the following analysis we study the impact of a change in the
parameter β, knowing that this value is clearly less than 1 (Bommier et al., 2006).
Finally, we assume that α = 0.885 (Hairault and Langot, 2008), but we study what
happens if α varies around this benchmark value.
Firstly, let us consider that β = 0.09, i.e. that an increase in wages of 1% implies an
increase in the length of life of 0.09%. Figure (4) illustrates this case.
For the value of α calculated by Hairault and Langot (2008), then it is clear that agents
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Figure 5: Net Contributions for diﬀerent values of α and for β = 0.18
with a wage below 1.6 and above 5.2 beneﬁt from the pension system. The richest have
a net contribution more negative than the net contribution of the poorest. Agents with a
wage in the interval [1.6,5.2] have a positive net contribution and ﬁnance the negative net
contributions of the two extremes. If α increases, i.e. that the pension system becomes
more Bismarkian, then less poor agents beneﬁt from a negative net contribution whereas
the net contributions becomes negative for wages above 2.8. It is almost a regressive pen-
sion system. Finally, if α = 0.7, then the redistributive properties of the pension system
endure. The poorest beneﬁt the most from the pension system and the richest have the
highest positive net contribution.
Let us now assume that β = 0.18. The elasticity of the length of life is twice as high as
before. Then the previous qualitative results endure (see ﬁgure (5)), but pension system is
clearly regressive because only very small wages beneﬁt from a negative net contribution.
Agents with a wage above 2.4 have a negative net contribution and the richest beneﬁt the
most from the pension system. This result is also more true for α = 0.95. Finally, even for
α = 0.7 the redistributive properties of the pension system are less clear.
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8 Conclusion
Our contribution permits to clarify theoretically the debate on the redistributive properties
of pension systems when there exists inequalities of length of life and notably the sentence
from Mitchell and Zeldes (1996) cited above. It is shown that Beveridgian pension systems
are less progressive than they seem and that Bismarkian pension systems are regressive.
Moreover, it permits to show that for mixed pension systems, there can be a redistribution
of resources from the middle to the ends of the distribution of wages. This last point
would have to be taken into account for empirical analysis which study the progressivity
of pension systems.
Our theoretical analysis is a ﬁrst attempt which clariﬁes the debate on the progressivity
of pension systems once life expectancy inequalities are taken into account. The next step
on our research agenda would be to use a micro-simulation model, as in Liebman (2001),
on French data. It would permit to quantify the impact of life expectancy inequalities on
the redistributive properties of pension systems.
APPENDIX A
Indeed, the covariance can also be written as:
∫
Ωw
(w − w¯)(T (w)− T¯ )f(w)dw. But as∫
Ωw
(w − w¯)f(w)dw = 0, we can write that: ∫Ωw(w − w¯)(T (w) − T¯ )f(w)dw = ∫Ωw(w −
w¯)(T (w) − X)f(w)da, with X a constant, whatever the value of X. So it is particu-
lary true for X = T (w¯). Then we can write that:
∫
Ωw
(w − w¯)(T (w) − T¯ )f(w)dw =∫
Ωw
(w− w¯)(T (w)− T (w¯))f(w)dw. The right-hand-side is positive as it is an integral on a
product of terms which have the same sign because T ′(w) > 0.2
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